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Abstract 
In the West African sub region, the second monetary zone known as the West African 
Monetary Zone (WAMZ) was launched in 2002. Membership of the WAMZ is currently 
made up of The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia Nigeria and Sierra Leone. This paper 
carried out monetary policy rule based stress test to examine an aspect of the feasibility 
test of this second monetary union by assessing the ease of monetary integration of the 
proposed currency zone as well as the adequacy of single monetary policy for national 
stability of the six member countries that are expected to lose their respective monetary 
independence on the commencement of the monetary union and the institution of a 
common central bank which would make single monetary policy for the proposed 
monetary union. The two  monetary policy rules (the McCallum monetary base growth 
rule and the Taylor nominal interest rate rule) employed this study generated the 
counterfactual interest rates  and monetary growth rates at national and union levels. 
Relevant annual secondary data were sourced from various databases spanning over the 
25-year period between 1990 and 2014. Findings produce evidence to suggest  that 
Nigeria is strongly likely to be the crucial major determinant of the single monetray policy 
stance within the future currency union. However, these two monetary policy rules 
principally generated varied results. The estimated counterfactual Taylor rule nominal 
interest rates suggests that Ghana, Guinea and Nigeria have the prospects of coming 
together to form a sustainable currency union on the long run. While the inferences from 
the alternative McCallum rule base money growth estimations, is that The Gambia, 
Liberia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone would be able to form a sustainable monetary 
integration and operates conveniently within a common monetary policy that would 
adequately ensure the achievement of national stability. The most crucial evidences given 
by the two monetary policy rule stress test results are about the suggestions of the order 
in which the six WAMZ countries would be at ease in joining the proposed monetary 
union. For the Taylor rule counterfactual nominal interest rate, Nigeria is at the fore front, 
followed (in the order) by Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, The Gambia and Sierra Leone. The 
evidences from McCallum rule counterfactual base money growth monetary stress 
estimations also shows Nigeria at top of the ladder, followed (in the order) by Liberia, 
Sierra Leone, The Gambia, Ghana and Guinea. One common finding from this monetary 
policy rules stress tests suggests that Nigeria is solely guarenteed to find the monetary 
integration easy as well the single monetary policy adequate for its national stability. 
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1.1  Introduction 
The Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was revised 
in 1993. The aim of the revised treaty was to accelerate the economic integration 
process and strengthen political cooperation. It has a long term objective of establishing 
an economic and monetary union between all member countries. This ECOWAS revised 
objectives caused the formation in 2000 the second monetary zone (apart from the 
UEMOA) when five countries (The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria and Sierra Leone) 
signed the Accra Declaration that established the West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ). 
Eventually, on 20 April, 2002, the WAMZ as the second monetary zone was launched. 
Membership of the WAMZ was made up of The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria and 
Sierra Leone. The WAMZ formally came into existence on 15 December, 2000 when the 
five countries signed the Articles of Agreement of the zone. The thinking was that the 
successful launching of the WAMZ would aid the merger with the CFA zone to usher in 
the ECOWAS single currency, the eco. The objective of the WAMZ is to establish a 
monetary union that will be characterised by a common central bank and a single 
currency, the eco, to replace the existing five national currencies. Liberia later joined the 
WAMZ.  
 Members of the West African Monetary Zone that decided to participate in the 
monetary zone will eventually abandon their national currencies; lose the control of 
their respective national monetary policies and fix their nominal exchange rates in 
relation to each other. From that date, the WAMZ member countries will neither be able 
to change short term interest rates nor change exchange rates (price of their 
currencies). They will no more be able to determine the quantity of money within their 
respective economies. As alternative to exchange rate, for countries in this category, 
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only factor mobility (capital mobility and labour mobility) and wage flexibility will 
remain the main adjustment mechanisms.  The loss of the ability of a member of a 
monetary union (like WAMZ countries) to operate national monetary and exchange rate 
policies independently in the presence of asymmetric shocks will be a cost of monetary 
union to these countries. However, the West African Monetary Zone will be an optimum 
currency area if the benefits that the six member countries will receive for joining the 
monetary union will outstrip or outweigh the costs of being in the union. The key 
concern for the proposed monetary cooperation within the WAMZ is the uniformity in 
inflation and output growth dynamics and the responses of these macroeconomic 
indicators to shocks and whether this will affect member countries in the same manner. 
Therefore if a WAMZ member country has large asymmetric (country-specific) shock 
and there is no appropriate adjustment mechanism, such country should not join the 
common currency area; and if this apply to a group of countries planning to go into 
monetary union, it is not advisable for such group of countries to create a common 
currency union. This is because of the cost of maintaining a fixed exchange rate which 
would outweigh the benefits of such fixed exchange regime.  
It is against this background that this paper aims at testing an aspect of the feasibility of 
the West African Monetary Zone as currency union by examining the perspective of the 
ease of monetary integration of the proposed currency zone as well as the adequacy of 
single monetary policy for national stability of the six member countries who would 
lose their respective monetary independence on the commencement of the monetary 
union and the institution of a common central bank which would make single monetary 
policy for the proposed monetary union. The assesments are performed with the 
application of two monetary policy rules, the McCallum monetary base growth rule and 
the Taylor nominal interest rate rule) to estimate the levels and indicators of monetary 
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policy stress tests of the WAMZ member countries. Therefore, the research questions to 
be answered by this paper is about the extent to which future common interest rate and 
common monetary growth within the WAMZ as a monetary union would meet the 
desires of the member nations and achieve national stabilisation purposes in these 
countries.  
2.1 Theoretical Frameworks of the Monetary Policy Rules 
From the era of Gold Standard to recent past, one can conclude that there is a long 
history of monetary rules. Many academics and economists have come up with various 
rules considered 'operational' for monetary policy. Many of these rules are 
characterised by complexities. Friedman's K%  rule (proposing the keeping of money 
growth to a fixed percentage at every period) is an example of a popular simple rule. 
Nevertheless, it is a matter of principles that an optimal monetary policy rule should 
critically depend on the relationships between macroeconomic indicators as the 
relationship between monetary policy instruments and economic outcomes. Practically, 
there have been lack of clear understanding of these relationships and there are 
difficulties in identifying policy rules that are robust in eliminating the necessity for 
discretion in monetary policy decision making. Lately, many developed and developing 
economies have resuscitated simple monetary rules that guide discretion. There have 
been suggestions made by many economists, of rules that adjust monetary policy 
instrument in reaction to observed deviation of policy objectives from targets or the 
desired trend. The monetary base rule suggested by Bennett T. McCallum (1988)  and 
the nominal interest rate rule proposed by John B. Taylor (1993) belong to the class of 
such monetary rules. Many regard the McCallum monetary rule as an alternative to the 
Taylor rule. This paper applies these two monetary policy rules in the stress tests of the 
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WAMZ member countries in assessing the adequacy of single monetary policy for these 
countries as well as examining the ease of monetary integration of the proposed 
currency union.  
In setting monetary policy instrument, the Taylor rule (TR) and the McCallum rule (MR) 
are similar fundamentally, but have some technical differences. As policy instrument, it 
is short term interest rate in the Taylor rule while base money is the instrument in the 
McCallum rule. Both monetary rules give room for feedback. The TR feeds back from the 
deviations in the right hand side of the equation (inflation deviations and output gaps) 
suggesting that whenever inflation is above its target and output above the trend, there 
would be monetary policy which is tighter than what should be in the 'neutral stance'; 
and the deviations are otherwise when monetary policy are easier than what should be 
when the posture is 'neutral'. This, in economic terms is perceived as "leaning against 
the wind."1 The feedback goes on to illustrate that the appropriate monetary policy is 
not in any way static. For instance, according to the TR, if inflation rate changes occur, 
there will be also be changes in the appropriate level of policy instrument, because if 
nominal interest rate is left unchanged when inflation rate rises, this would amount to 
the loosening of monetary policy. For the MR, the feedback is from deviations in 
nominal income from a target path assumed (Stuart, 1996). 
This paper applies these two monetary policy rules in the stress tests of the WAMZ 
member countries in assessing the adequacy of single monetary policy for these 
                                                          
1 'Leaning against the wind' in this respect is a term that qualifies a countercyclical monetary policy in which the 
monetary authorities act to keep the inflationary boom down or boost the economic growth during recession. 
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countries as well as examining the ease of monetary integration of the proposed 
currency union.  
2. 2 The Taylor Interest Rate Rule of Monetary Policy 
For the past few decades, the change from discretional policies to rule-based policies 
and the delegation of authority to independent central bank have been the observed 
crucial tendencies in the conduct of monetary policy. Consequently, modern central 
banking embraces the adoption of interest rate arrangement in which short term 
interest rates would serve as the monetary policy instrument. Many understand the 
monetary policy rules to be interest rate rule that, in monetary policy transmission 
mechanism, links interest rate (which serves as the main policy instrument) with some 
other variables considered by the monetary authorities while making necessary 
adjustments of policy instruments. Inflation is usually the final target of the policy. It is a 
monetary economic practice that monetary policy is uncontroversially set by the central 
bank. In the process, the central bank (hereinafter referred to as the CB) analyses the 
economy and thereafter consider how best to set the policy instrument it has.2 In doing 
so, the CB acts in accordance with the dictates of the current economy and also in 
consideration of its assessment of the effects of the overall level of demand in the 
economy and how demand is linked with the ultimate policy target. A widely accepted 
rule in this respect is known as ‘Taylor Rule’.  
John Taylor, a Stanford economist developed the famous ‘Taylor Rule’ (hereinafter referred to as ‘TR’) for monetary policy in 1993. The monetary rule recommended that 
the US federal fund rate be adjusted in response to output gap and inflation gap.3 The 
                                                          
2
 This is usually the short term money market interest rates.  
3
 Output gap is how GDP has deviated from its potential while inflation gap how inflation deviated from its 
desired rate. 
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rule was meant to capture the major factors affecting the decision making and actions of 
the US monetary authority. The suggestion made by Taylor (1993) was that in setting 
monetary policy, a good rule should attempt at making the policy rate a positive 
function of output gap and inflation. Since Taylor came up with the rule, many monetary 
policy decisions in the modern world are based on TR which serves as benchmark for 
the paths of monetary policy and the way it should be conducted.4 Taylor (1993) made 
historical account and analysis of monetary policy rules and concludes that the rule is 
useful in making practical decisions based on the fact that it characterises and evaluate 
past behaviour of monetary policy action by giving information on how optimal 
responses are generated towards changes in macroeconomic conditions. He highlights 
further that in order to respond to changes in the price level or changes in real income, 
changes in the US Federal fund rates, it is necessary to have propelling good policy 
rules; stressing further he state that, given the fact that macroeconomic performances are revealed to be better when the policy rules describes the central bank’s decision, 
such policy-based actions would be optimal. 
Simply, Taylor Rule (TR) is a rule that states how the central bank’s interest rate should 
be set. It is a rule that summarises the link between the level of short term interest rate 
on one hand and output and inflation on the other hand. It serves as a rule of thumb that 
formalises the intention of a policymaker to stabilise inflation and output (Taylor, 
1993). In explaining the degree of influence of output and inflation gaps on the policy 
rate, overheating in the economy causes GDP to exceed its potential, leading to positive 
output gap which exerted upward pressure on inflation. To contain the inflation, the CB 
would raise the interest rate under its control as this would cool the economy down. If 
                                                          
4
 Though, many economists regard the rule as not comprehensive enough. 
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inflation is already high above its desired level, the CB would cause downward pressure 
on inflation by slowing down the economy. 
The decision of the CB to set interest rate is based on the current economic situation 
and the TR serves as a useful general monetary policy framework within which 
decisions regarding interest rates are made. Typically, TR states that:  
nominal interest rate =  (equilibrium nominal interest rate) +ψ .(inflation deviation from 
target) + δ . (output gap)  
Where δ and ψ are positive numbers (weights) 
TR hypothesises that the CB should raise interest rates if the output gap is positive 
(when GDP is above its trend values) and when inflation is above its target.5 Policy 
shifts in output and inflation as well as the inflation volatility and output volatility 
chosen by the policymaker are pronounced by the positive coefficients δ and ψ. The coefficients δ and ψ will be small if inflation is very sensitive to changes in interest rate. If volatilities of output and inflation are not tolerated, coefficients δ and ψ will 
respectively be large.  A salient feature of the TR is that inflation gap coefficient should 
be positive and be equal to half (0.5). Therefore, an increase in inflation rate by 1% 
point would cause the target rate to rise by 1.5% points which implies that 1% point 
rise in inflation leads to real interest rate increase by 0.5%. This principle that the CB 
should increase the nominal interest rate more than the increase in inflation rate is the 
principle at the centre point of the TR which Mishkin (2010) sees as critical to the 
success of monetary policy. The TR principle is that on the average, inflation target is 
                                                          
5There are many varieties of versions of the TR as many use the gap between expected future inflation and 
inflation target rather current inflation. For the purpose of smoothing out interest rate changes, some introduce 
lagged values of interest rates. 
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not achievable unless the long run inflation coefficient is 1; and given this it would be 
impossible for monetary policy to serve as nominal anchor because inflation would not 
be effectively tied down to a fixed value and the central bank would be ‘leaning against the wind’ only when inflation coefficient is more than 1.6  
As advocated by the New Keynesian Economists, TR states that there should be an 
inflation target rate of the CB and that the interest rate should be adjusted according to 
the distance of inflation and output from their respective targets (King, 2012). Howells 
and Bains (2008) stress the need for the CB to carefully pay all attention to current 
inflation rate and how it relates its target and output gap. Highlighting the essence of 
TR, Blanchard (2009) reiterates the position of John Taylor that 'because the CB affects 
spending  through interest rate, the CB should think directly in terms of choice of an 
interest rate rather than a rate of nominal money growth.’ Blanchard further points out 
that the TR has generated a lot of interests from researchers and CBs and that more 
generally, the thinking of most policy makers has now shifted from nominal money 
growth to thinking about interest rate rules and from whatever happens to nominal 
money growth due to shifts of interests to nominal interest rate rules (as the TR) is 
increasingly seen as irrelevant by economists, financial markets and the CBs.  
The popularity of TR has been increasing because: (i) it is clear and simple. Given the 
role of inflation rate and output gap in the model, TR provides a glaring link between 
the current policy rate and the current economic conditions. With TR, there is no need 
for a forecasting model as the observation of current inflation and the estimation of the 
current output gaps are enough for forecast purposes; (ii) TR well describes the 
                                                          
6This is according to Smith Jennifer. There is the natural one-for-one response of the nominal interest rate with 
inflation increase (Fisher Effect) and this makes the inflation coefficient to be exactly 1. This implies that the 
CB attempts not to slow down the movement of inflation.  
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behaviour of monetary policies in many countries.7 Using a simple monetary policy rule 
like TR portends an advantage of accuracy in its goals and usefulness by specifying 
responses to inflation and output gaps and at the same time stabilising these variables. 
However, despite the merits of TR and how it guides monetary policymakers, Peerman 
and Smets (1999) spot that TR may not be robust to changes in the economic structure 
of the economy, stating that generally, the efficient feedback coefficient will be 
complicated functions of the preference of the monetary authority and also of the 
structural parameters of the model of the economy as for instance, changes in the 
efficient feedback coefficient emanate from changes in the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism.  
Originally, Taylor Rule expresses the policy rate to be a function of the output gap and 
inflation gap. Whenever output exceeds its potential, this indicates inflationary 
pressures and the monetary authority should raise the policy rate in order to 
accommodate such pressure. Similarly, when inflation rates goes beyond its desire rate, 
the policymaker should increase the policy rate. TR was able to show that a simple 
reaction function in which the policy rate responded to movements in fundamental 
macroeconomic variables of inflation and output gap followed the observed path of the 
monetary authorities of the US in the late 1980s and up to early 1990s. In the model, 
Taylor assigned 0.5 to these macroeconomic variables (output gap and inflation). 
Therefore, TR as a reaction function reflects the reaction of the policy interest rate to 
shocks to inflation and output gap. The degree of co-movement of the TR implied rates 
                                                          
7 Peersman and Smets (1999) report Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998) to have shown how a version of TR with interest rate 
smoothing could explain short term interest rate in G3 countries and also how Gerlach and Schnabel (1999)  got evidence 
that the description of the euro area average short term interest rates in the 1990s in line the TR recorded 0.5 coefficient on 
output gap and 1.5 coefficient for inflation. 
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between member countries of a monetary union is an indication of the degree of 
similarity of the aggregated shocks hitting these individual economies.  
Since the announcement of the intention to form WAMZ 2000, the strategies of the 
monetary policies of the WAMZ's national economies were being propelled by the focus 
on achieving the stipulated 5% inflation convergence criterion as these countries were 
operating under the laid down primary and secondary convergence criteria which by 
implications are constraints on their paths towards being members of the WAMZ.  
According to the benchmark TR, the monetary authority should set the short term 
interest rate in proportion to the output gap and the rate of inflation. The assumption of 
the baseline TR is that the CB sets the nominal short-term interest rate to be a function 
of the inflation and output gap. As a formula, TR was designed towards recommending 
how monetary authorities should set short term policy interest rates to achieve the 
short term objectives of stabilising the economy as well as the long run objective of 
moderating inflation. A general model of TR is: 
  𝑖 = 𝑟∗ + 𝜋𝑡 + 𝛼(𝜋𝑡 − 𝜋∗) + 𝛽(𝑦𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡∗)                                            1 
Where 𝑟∗ is the real’ natural’ interest rate;8 𝜋𝑡 is inflation rate; 𝜋∗is the target inflation 
rate; 𝑦𝑡 is output and 𝑦𝑡∗is the potential output. According to this rule in equation (1), the 
policy rate should rise if inflation rises above inflation target or if output (the real GDP) 
moves above the level of its target. In times of high inflation when employment is above the ‘full employment’ level, the policymaker should increase the policy rate; and reduce 
this policy rate when the situations are otherwise. This implies that the nominal policy 
rate(𝑖) will equal the sum of the long run equilibrium real interest rate (𝑟∗ ) and target 
                                                          
8 This corresponds with the interest rate when the economy is at equilibrium natural rate of unemployment or at the 
equivalent potential output (𝑦𝑡∗) 
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inflation (𝜋∗). In Equation (1), if coefficients 𝛼 and 𝛽 are large, aggressive responses to 
excess inflation and to economic booms should be put in place as monetary policy rule. 
A large 𝛼 relative 𝛽 would specify that the CB would give more aggressive response to 
inflation than the level of economic activity. When 𝛽 = 0, it indicates a situation of pure 
inflation targeting. Donrnbusch , Fischer and Startz (2011) point out that this rule is about monetary authority’s manipulation of interest rate to stabilise output around 
potential and not simply about increasing output. If the nominal interest rate equals the 
real interest rate plus inflation, increase in nominal interest rate by more than the increase in inflation will, in line with the TR, increase real interest rate, thus ‘cooling off the economy’ as inflation increases.  
The empirical evidence of policy reaction function estimation by Taylor (1993) suggests 
that empirical approximation of monetary policy is possible for setting interest rate 
through the simple rule which hypothesise that the policy rate(𝑖) should be above its 
long run level (𝑟∗ +  𝜋∗) when the actual inflation (𝜋𝑡 ) is above the target inflation (𝜋∗) 
and the economic output (𝑦𝑡 ) is above its full employment level where output gap is 
positive. Thus, the specific model of TR (for the US) is: 
  𝑖 = 2 + 𝜋𝑡 + 0.5 𝑋 (𝜋𝑡 − 𝜋∗) + 0.5 𝑋(𝑦𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡∗)                                   2 
In this original TR in equation (2), equal weight of 0.5 was apportioned to inflation and 
output gaps while, the inflation target (𝜋∗) and the equilibrium real interest rate (𝑟∗ ) 
were made to be 2% each. The rule is thus re-written as: 
𝑖 = 2 + 𝜋𝑡 + 0.5 𝑋 (𝜋𝑡 − 2) + 0.5 𝑋(𝑦𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡∗)                                            3 
 
 
13 
 
Thus, the parameterisation of the rule was: 
  𝜋∗ = 𝑟∗  = 2  
𝛼 = 𝛽 = 0.5 
Equation (3) can therefore be re-written as: 
  𝑖 = 2 + 1.5𝜋𝑡 − 0.5𝜋∗ +  0.5 𝑋 (𝑦𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡∗)                                 4 
This can transform to: 
  𝑖 = 1 + 1.5𝜋𝑡 +  0.5 𝑋(𝑦𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡∗)                                           5 
Equation (5) shows that in the original TR for the US, the constant was equal to 1 and 
that the estimated coefficient of inflation must be greater than 1. This shows that the TR recommends a ‘leaning against the wind’ policy in a way that the policy interest rate 
adjusts positively by a coefficient higher than one for inflation deviation and by a 
coefficient close for one to output (Taylor, 1999).  
This paper adopts the WAMZ's inflation convergence criterion of 5% as the target 
inflation; and the mean real interest rate (for the six WAMZ countries,) of 7% over the 
period spanning 1990 to 2014 as the equilibrium real interest rate for six countries in 
the WAMZ-specific Taylor Rule. However, rather than simply choosing or fixing values 
of the coefficient of parameters of inflation and output gap (as done by Taylor), these 
coefficients of  reaction functions of the WAMZ's CBs are econometrically estimated so 
as to capture the behaviour and important elements of the monetary policy in these 
member countries of the proposed currency union. In this econometric estimation, the 
money market rate is the dependent variable while inflation deviation and output gaps 
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are the independent variables. Table 2 shows the country-by-country estimated 
coefficients of inflation deviation from target and output gap respectively. 
In describing the monetary policy of the WAMZ member countries, the country-by-
country specific TR nominal interest rates are therefore expressed as:  
The Gambia:  𝑖𝐺𝑀𝑡 = 7 + 𝜋𝑡 − 0.0 𝑋 (𝜋𝑡 − 𝜋∗) + 34.5 𝑋(𝑦𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡∗)                                   6 
Ghana:   𝑖𝐺𝐻𝑡 = 7 + 𝜋𝑡 + 0.3 𝑋 (𝜋𝑡 − 𝜋∗) + 49.7 𝑋(𝑦𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡∗)                                   7 
Guinea:   𝑖𝐺𝑈𝑡 = 7 + 𝜋𝑡 + 0.2 𝑋 (𝜋𝑡 − 𝜋∗) + 119 𝑋(𝑦𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡∗)                                   8 
Liberia:  𝑖𝐿𝐵𝑡 = 7 + 𝜋𝑡 − 0.1 𝑋 (𝜋𝑡 − 𝜋∗) − 2 𝑋(𝑦𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡∗)                                   9 
Nigeria: 𝑖𝑁𝐺𝑡 = 7 + 𝜋𝑡 + 0.0 𝑋 (𝜋𝑡 − 𝜋∗) − 30.4 𝑋(𝑦𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡∗)                                   10 
Sierra Leone:  𝑖𝑆𝐿𝑡 = 7 + 𝜋𝑡 + 0.4 𝑋 (𝜋𝑡 − 𝜋∗) + 1.0 𝑋(𝑦𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡∗)                                   11 
2.3 The McCallum Monetary Base Rule of Monetary Policy 
McCallum (1987) stressed the principles necessary for the design of a monetary rule as: 
(i) the one that should be able to dictate the behaviour of a variable that can directly and 
accurately be controlled by the monetary authority. McCallum held the view that 
specifying the behaviour of some magnitude that is not itself controllable, such as the 
M1 measure of the money stock for instance, would be to leave task of rule design 
seriously incomplete; (ii) monetary rule should not rely essentially on the presumed 
absence of regulatory change and technical progress in the financial industry; (iii) the 
paths of both money stock and (nominal) interest rate are not important for their own 
sakes because they are only of relevance to the extent that they are useful in facilitating 
good performance of output and inflation; (iv) a well-designed monetary rule. In 
qualitative terms, McCallum proposed a rule that reflects these four principles. At the 
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starting point, there is the specification of a target path for nominal GDP characterised 
by even growth at a pre-specified rate that corresponds to the prevailing long term 
output growth average rate which is independent of monetary policy over an extended 
period. Therefore, keeping the growth in GDP at an appropriate value over a period 
should yield zero inflation (approximately) over such period. In addition, if the nominal 
GDP growth rate is prevented from fluctuating, swings of the real output from its trend 
paths would also be prevented. Though, on continuous basis, some fluctuations in 
output would still manifest, even when there is perfectly smooth growth path for 
nominal demand, probably, these would be as small as it can feasibly be obtained "due 
to lack of Phillips Curve model that could be relied upon". McCallum further advocated 
for the specification of operational mechanism that would keep the nominal growth rate 
close to the specified growth path by adopting a monetary base as monetary policy 
instrument, serving as a variable that can on regular basis be accurately set by the 
monetary authority operating within a political entity and economic environment of 
floating exchange rate system. This completes the rule which describes how big 
fluctuations of output are avoided by monetary authorities in applying base money as 
policy instrument. According to McCallum, the rule periodically adjusts the growth rate 
of base money. The base money would increase if nominal GDP is below its target path 
and vice versa. In its algebraic form, the McCallum monetary rule is stated as: 
∆𝑚𝑡 = ∆𝑥∗ − ∆𝑉𝑡𝑎 + 𝜆(∆𝑥∗ − ∆𝑥𝑡−1)                                             12 
where is ∆𝑚𝑡 base money growth rate, ∆𝑥∗is the nominal GDP growth rate target which 
is constant, estimated as the sum of long run average real GDP growth rate and inflation 
rate target, ∆𝑉𝑡𝑎 is the average base money velocity estimated by dividing base money 
by nominal GDP, and (∆𝑥∗ − ∆𝑥𝑡−1) is the deviation of nominal growth rate. This base 
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money growth rate rule is with the inflation targeting framework. Because (∆𝑥∗ −∆𝑥𝑡−1)  depicts pressure on inflation, an economy would display 'overheating' if the rate 
of GDP growth is higher than the rate of inflation target, prompting reduction in the 
base money growth. The McCallum rule is thus an automatic stabiliser. The growth rate 
of money base is the monetary policy instrument here.  
The value of coefficient (𝜆)of has to be chosen and fixed in order to: (a) give adequate 
responsiveness of base money growth to departures of nominal GDP from its target 
path, and (b) to prevent the induction of dynamic instability that can cause 'too strong' 
feedback effects. Therefore, a carefully fixed coefficient (𝜆) would give automatic 
adjustment to the money base and growth rates in a way that would on average, yield 
zero inflation in reaction to base 'velocity' alterations caused by regulatory or technical 
changes. For ∆𝑉𝑡𝑎 (average base velocity), McCallum used a four-year period, 4.5% for ∆𝑥∗ (the nominal GDP growth rate target) and assumed a value of 0.5 for (𝜆), the 
coefficient of nominal growth rate deviations. In terms of aggregate demand, even with 
drastic changes in this form, increase in monetary base changes would make monetary 
policy to be expansionary, while on the other hand, there would be contractions when 
monetary policy changes decrease. 
The McCallum monetary policy rule equation indicates that the growth of monetary 
base depends on three terms on the right hand side of Equation 12, that determine the 
monetary base growth. The first term is a constant which is the combination of the 
desired inflation plus the potential GDP growth. The second term, the monetary base 
velocity growth rate which assists in preventing the price level from drifts that may be 
caused by its response to money demand permanent shock. Under the assumption that 
monetary policy is neutral in the long run, if the growth rate of base money velocity is 
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steady while the level of nominal GDP and its targets are at par, inflation rate would be 
forced to its target by this monetary rule. The third term stabilises the properties of the 
McCallum rule. Whenever the nominal GDP deviates from target, monetary authorities 
are prompted to adjust the growth of monetary base.   
There are some basic characteristics of the McCallum monetary policy rule. First is the 
preference of nominal GDP over monetary aggregates (like M1 and M2) as the principal 
target variable of the monetary authority, since the nominal GDP exhibits correlation 
with real GDP and inflation. Furthermore, within the nominal GDP targeting system, the 
nominal GDP shows some traits that makes it in principle, to be a good guide in 
monetary policy decision making as monetary policy adjusts to offset aggregate demand 
disturbances and as it helps the monetary authority to strike the balance between the 
inflation and output growth stability objectives when the response to aggregate supply 
disturbances are to recognised. The preference of the nominal GDP over real GDP in this 
rule is borne out of the view that the monetary authorities can neither accurately 
control nor predict how the nominal GDP growth divides between inflation and real 
growth. The second element of the McCallum rule is the introduction of a constant 
growth target for nominal income instead of variation in target rate over the cycle. This 
is likely to remove unwanted fluctuations caused by policy surprises emanating from 
the pursuit of an optimal monetary policy decisions by the central bank. A principal 
feature of the McCallum rule is the use of monetary base (rather than nominal interest 
rate) as a monetary policy instrument. The argument brought forward by McCallum in 
this respect is that tightening or easing of the policy stance are ambiguous when the 
nominal interest rate is applied as monetary policy stance indicator. Because the 
monetary authority can control the monetary base variable with very high degree of 
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accuracy, this monetary base policy rule is consequently regarded as 'desirably 
operational'. 
Rather  than simply choosing or fixing values of 0.5 for (𝜆),the coefficient of nominal 
GDP deviation as McCallum did, this coefficient for individual WAMZ countries were  
estimated econometrically so as to capture the actual behaviour of the related 
macroeconomics of the member countries of this proposed currency union.  The 5% 
inflation target in the WAMZ's convergence criteria was applied. In consideration of 
these and the  respective country's constant (the GDP growth rate target) and the base 
money velocity in describing the monetary policy of the WAMZ member countries, the 
country-by-country specific monetary base growth rates are therefore expressed as:  
The Gambia: ∆𝑚𝐺𝑀𝑡 = 8.3 − ∆𝑉𝑡𝑎 + 𝜆(8.3 − ∆𝑥𝑡−1)                                             13 
Ghana:  ∆𝑚𝐺𝐻𝑡 = 11.6 − ∆𝑉𝑡𝑎 + 𝜆(11.6 − ∆𝑥𝑡−1)                                             14 
Guinea:   ∆𝑚𝐺𝑈𝑡 = 8.2 − ∆𝑉𝑡𝑎 + 𝜆(8.2 − ∆𝑥𝑡−1)                                             15 
Liberia: ∆𝑚𝐿𝐵𝑡 = 11.2 − ∆𝑉𝑡𝑎 + 𝜆(11.2 − ∆𝑥𝑡−1)                                             16 
Nigeria: ∆𝑚𝑁𝐺𝑡 = 10.8 − ∆𝑉𝑡𝑎 + 𝜆(10.8 − ∆𝑥𝑡−1)                                             17 
Sierra Leone: ∆𝑚𝑆𝐿𝑡 = 8.8 − ∆𝑉𝑡𝑎 + 𝜆(8.8 − ∆𝑥𝑡−1)                                             18 
3.1 Data and Methods 
This paper covers the six countries in the WAMZ; and to achieve the aim of the study, all 
necessary data were collected for these countries from the databases of the Economic 
Intelligence Unit (EIU), the West African Monetary Authority (WAMA) and the IMF's 
International Financial Statistics (IFS). Owing to data collection constraints, these 
annual data spanning over the 25-year period between 1990 and 2014 are for real GDP, 
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nominal GDP, inflation (GDP deflator), real interest rates, base money (M1) and base 
money (M1) annual growth.  
The actual real output data is taken as the real GDP (constant) seasonally adjusted in US 
dollars at 2006 price, expressed in logarithmic form. Potential output is determined by 
fitting a time trend to actual output. Inflation rate is taken as the year-on-year changes 
in inflation calculated with the GDP deflator. The inflation target of 5% (as prescribed 
for all the WAMZ countries as a primary convergence criterion) is adopted as inflation 
target for all and thereof, deviations of the actual inflation rates from this inflation 
target are calculated for each member country of the zone. The money market rates of 
individual central bank are employed as the policy nominal interest rate. For each 
country, real interest rate is estimated with lending rates adjusted for inflation which is 
measured by the GDP deflator. In the calculation of the output gaps which is the 
deviation of real output from the potential output as a percentage of potential output,  
the Hodrick-Prescot (with lambda (λ) =100 for annual data) filter method was applied 
to filter the potential output (trend) from the real output. The velocity of the base 
money variable was constructed by dividing the nominal GDP by base money (M1) 
while the constant, the nominal GDP growth rate target is an addition of the WAMZ 
convergence criteria inflation target of 5% and average real GDP of each country over 
the 25 years covered by the study. 
Apart from treading the path of the US by adapting the description of monetary policy 
as rule that depends upon developments in both inflation and output gaps as 
established by the Taylor Rule (TR), the European Central Bank (ECB), the common 
central bank of the European Monetary Union (EMU) as well, based its monetary policy 
strategy on the two pillars on which the TR rests. Money is accorded a prominent role in 
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one of the pillars in which inflation as a monetary phenomenon, takes cognisance of the 
annual growth rate of money supply aggregates. Price development and price stability 
risk are what the second pillar depicts; and output gap is a macroeconomic indicator 
variable considered in this respect. 
Using the two monetary policy rule (the Taylor Rule and the McCallum Rule) to estimate 
the optimal counterfactual paths of interest rate and money supply growth of the WAMZ 
member countries' central bank and the WAMZ that correspond with the 
macroeconomic fundamentals of the aggregates of these countries and the monetary 
zone as a currency union, I apply the following five-stage procedure to estimate the 
stress levels of member countries of the proposed currency union as well as testing the 
adequacy of a single monetary policy for these countries: 
At the first stage, the annual short term counterfactual nominal interest rates, according 
to the TR specifications in Equations (6-11) are calculated for each WAMZ country. For 
the monetary base rule, the counterfactual base money growth rates, according to the 
McCallum monetary rule specifications in Equations (13-18) are equally estimated to 
the WAMZ countries at this stage. 
At the second stage, averages of the estimated TR counterfactual nominal rates are 
calculated for each WAMZ country as well as averages of the estimated counterfactual 
monetary base growth in order to identify the potential members of the proposed 
currency union. The conjecture here is that countries exhibiting similar interest rate 
and similar monetary base growth rates would have the prospect of forming a 
sustainable currency union on the long run.  
21 
 
Because the WAMZ is yet to take off as monetary union with a common central bank, 
area-wide counterfactual nominal interest rates and counterfactual monetary base 
growth rates are calculated for the entire monetary zone in stage three. This is based on 
weighted average of WAMZ member countries' TR-estimated nominal interest rates as 
well as the weighted averages of base money growth rates. The weighted average takes 
care of the view that when members of a monetary union lose monetary independence, 
the setting of interest rates and the determination of money supply growth for the 
monetary union are meant to serve the interest of countries that have high levels of 
influence on others. In this respect, this paper applies the 2014 current GDP (in US 
dollars) for each WAMZ member country as the indicator of weight. The area-wide 
counterfactual interest rate and area-wide money supply growth rate for the WAMZ as a 
proposed monetary union are therefore estimated with the following derived equation: 
𝑖𝑊𝐴𝑀𝑍𝑡 = Σ(𝑊𝐶 . 𝑖𝑐𝑡)                                                     19 
and 
𝑚𝑊𝐴𝑀𝑍𝑡 = Σ(𝑊𝐶 . 𝑚𝑐𝑡)                                                     20 
where 𝑖𝑊𝐴𝑀𝑍  and 𝑚𝑊𝐴𝑀𝑍 are the area-wide counterfactual interest rate and area-
wide money supply growth respectively, for the WAMZ, 𝑊𝐶  is the weight of each WAMZ 
country, which is the country's GDP share of the total of the GDP of the six countries in 
the monetary zone, and 𝑖 is the estimated TR nominal interest rate for each member 
country (calculated in stage one), and 𝑚 is the monetary base growth rate (calculated in 
stage one).  
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At the fourth stage, the annual stress level for individual WAMZ country is estimated as 
the difference in the respective country's annual TR counterfactual nominal interest 
rate and the monetary zone's area-wide counterfactual nominal interest rate thus: 
𝑆𝑡 = 𝑖𝑡 − 𝑖𝑊𝐴𝑀𝑍𝑡                                                             21 
where 𝑆𝑡 is the WAMZ country specific stress level at time 𝑡;𝑖𝑡 is the country's TR rate at 
time 𝑡 and 𝑖𝑊𝐴𝑀𝑍𝑡 is the area-wide TR rate for the WAMZ at time 𝑡. Further annual 
stress levels for each member countries of the WAMZ are calculated as the difference in 
the respective country's annual monetary based growth rate and the monetary zone's 
area-wide monetary growth rate both estimated based on the McCallum monetary rule 
thus: 
𝑆𝑡 = 𝑚𝑡 − 𝑚𝑊𝐴𝑀𝑍𝑡                                                              22 
where 𝑚𝑡 is the country's TR rate at time 𝑡 and 𝑚𝑊𝐴𝑀𝑍𝑡  is the area-wide base money 
growth rate for the WAMZ at time 𝑡. 
The lower the stress level displayed by a country, the closer such country's 
independently set interest rate/monetary base growth rate and proposed currency 
union's interest rate/monetary base growth rate, indicating the adequacy of a single 
monetary policy for the achievement of national stability in such member country. This 
indicates easy monetary integration which would be sustainable. On the contrary, if the 
stress level for is high, it depicts a wide difference between monetary base growth 
rate/the interest rate set independently by a country showing such high level of stress 
and the proposed currency union's area-wide interest rate/monetary base growth rate, 
with further implication of inadequacy of single monetary policy for such country as 
well as possible difficulty in monetary integration of the monetary zone and given the 
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unsustainable posture of the monetary union. The difference between each country's 
independently set TR interest rate/McCallum's rule monetary base growth  and the 
area-wide interest rate/McCallum's rule monetary base growth  may either be positive 
or negative in value. For the TR counterfactual nominal interest rates assessment, a 
positive stress value indicates that the country showing this had monetary policy that is 
tight when compared with that of the proposed currency union, while a country 
exhibiting a comparatively more expansionary monetary policy would show negative 
stress. On the other hand, for the MC counterfactual base money growth evaluation, a 
positive stress value implies a monetary policy that is comparatively more 
expansionary in relation to the proposed currency union's monetary policy, while a 
negative stress value is an indication of a comparatively tight monetary policy. 
In order to make comparisons of monetary stress among the six WAMZ countries 
possible, stress indicators are constructed by estimating the root mean squared stress 
for each country under the two monetary rule respectively thus9: 
𝑖𝑅𝑀𝑆 = √∑ (𝑖𝑡−𝑖𝑊𝐴𝑀𝑍𝑡)2𝑇𝑡=1 𝑇                                                        23 
and 
𝑚𝑅𝑀𝑆 = √∑ (𝑚𝑡−𝑚𝑊𝐴𝑀𝑍)2𝑇𝑡=1 𝑇                                                        24 
 
                                                          
9 As obtained in Moon and Poeck (2005) 
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where 𝑖𝑅𝑀𝑆 and 𝑚𝑅𝑀𝑆 are the stress indicator under the TR rule (depicting interest 
rate gaps) and McCallum rule (indicating base money growth gaps) respectively, and  𝑇 
is the number of years. 
4.1 Discussion of Findings 
The country-by-country weight employed in this study as derived from the 2014 
nominal GDP (in US dollars) is displayed in Table 1 below showing Nigeria as having the 
heaviest weight of 91.5% depicting crucial and landmark implications for the 
determination of the counterfactual and future monetary policy stance of the common 
central bank for proposed second currency union (the WAMZ) in the West African sub 
region. The Gambia has the lowest share of 0.001. 
Table 1: WAMZ Countries' Weights (as derived from the 2014 Nominal (US dollars) GDP) 
 Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
Weight 0.001 0.062 0.011 0.003 0.915 0.008 
 Source: EIU database and author's estimations 
As stated earlier, with the loss of monetary independence by member states of a 
monetary union, the setting of policy interest rate and the determination of the money 
supply and money supply growth for the entire union would reflect the interests of 
countries demonstrating high degree of influences on other members; and in the case of 
the WAMZ, the weight displayed by Nigeria is heavy enough for the country to influence 
monetary policy decisions (including other decisions) within the proposed currency 
union. A diagrammatic representation of weights exhibited by each member country of 
the WAMZ is as shown in Figure 1 in the appendix. 
For the results generated by this study to closely reflect the macroeconomic actual and 
developments within the monetary zone, the weight/coefficients of indicators in the 
equations applied in generating the Taylor rule (TR) interest rates (with and without 
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interest rate smoothing) and the McCallum rule (MR) base money growth rates were 
econometrically generated through ordinary least square regressions of the related 
equations as displayed in Table 2 thus: 
Table 2: Econometric Derivation of Weights for Inflation Deviation and Output Gaps (TR) and 
Nominal Growth Deviation (McCallum) 
Taylor Rule Rate (without interest rate smoothing) 
 Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
Inflation 
Deviation 
-0.0 0.3 0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.4 
Output Gap 34.2 49.7 119 -2 -29.7 2.6 
Taylor Rule Rate (with interest rate smoothing) 
Inflation 
Deviation 
0.0 0.3 0.2 -0.0 0.0 0.3 
Output Gap 32.6 60.9 134.5 0.5 -22 -8.6 
McCallum Rule Monetary Base Growth Rate 
 Growth Deviation -0.1 -0.9 -1.6 0.2 -0.2 -0.4 
 Source: EIU and IMF databases and author's estimations and Eviews 7 Output 
The highs and the lows of the averages and volatilities of the counterfactual TR interest 
rate and the MR monetary base growth rate for the WAMZ member countries and the 
area-wide rate for the WAMZ as a future monetary union are presented in Table 3. 
Table 3: Averages and Volatilities of the Counterfactual Monetary Rule Rates (1990-2014) 
Taylor Rule Rate (without interest rate smoothing) 
 Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone WAMZ 
Rate 
Volatility 
16.96 
26.39 
33.72 
13.52 
20.16 
11.86 
12.04 
7.02 
28.61 
28.17 
41.04 
43.50 
28.84 
26.27 
Taylor Rule Rate (with interest rate smoothing) 
 Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone WAMZ 
Rate 
Volatility 
16.96 
26.38 
33.72 
13.53 
20.16 
11.83 
12.04 
7.47 
27.10 
25.57 
38.96 
40.34 
27.44 
23.88 
McCallum Rule Monetary Base Growth Rate 
 Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone WAMZ 
Rate 
Volatility 
-0.44 
5.44 
20.35 
7.45 
9.81 
17.66 
5.55 
4.44 
1.89 
5.48 
6.07 
12.13 
3.33 
5.18 
 Source: EIU and IMF databases and author's estimations 
 These averages and volatilities are over the 25-year period covered by this study. 
There are very close similarities in the results of averages and volatilities yielded under 
the TR interest rates estimations (with and without interest rate smoothing). 
Interestingly, Liberia shows the highest degree of stability (lowest volatility) in the 
three counterfactual monetary rule analyses. For the TR rates, The Gambia and Sierra 
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Leone shows the highest level of volatility, while Guinea has the highest volatility in the 
MC base money growth estimates. Also on the average, Liberia has the lowest 
counterfactual TR interest rate of 12.04 while the lowest counterfactual growth rate of 
money base was recorded by the Gambia. However, further analyses of the deviations of 
country-by-country averages of the counterfactual interest rates and base money 
growth from the counterfactual area-wide rates are necessary in determining the ease 
of monetary integration and the adequacy of single monetary rule for the member 
countries. For this purposes, the calculated deviations for each member country are 
estimated as exhibited in Table 4: 
Table 4: Deviations of Members' Averages and Volatilities of Counterfactual Monetary Rule Rates 
from Area-wide Counterfactual Monetary Rule Rates Averages and Volatilities (1990-2014) 
Taylor Rule Rate (without interest rate smoothing) 
 Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone Threshold 
TR Rate 
Volatility 
-11.88 
0.12 
4.88 
-12.75 
-8.68 
-14.41 
-16.8 
-19.25 
-0.23 
1.9 
12.20 
17.23 
±8.5 
±11 
Taylor Rule Rate (with interest rate smoothing) 
TR Rate 
Volatility 
-10.48 
2.50 
6.28 
-10.35 
-7.28 
-12.05 
-15.4 
-16.41 
-0.34 
1.69 
11.52 
16.46 
±9 
±9.9 
McCallum Rule Monetary Base Growth Rate 
TR Rate 
Volatility 
-3.77 
0.26 
17.02 
2.27 
6.48 
12.48 
2.22 
-0.74 
-1.44 
0.3 
2.74 
6.95 
±5.6 
±3.83 
 Source: Author's estimations 
 The simple rule is that the bigger the margin reflected by these deviations in 
these rates, the more difficult it would be for the affected country to be part of a 
sustainable currency union as well as the more inadequate a single monetary policy 
would be for individual countries affected. Further to this, threshold levels (determined 
by the average of the absolute values of deviations) are established as shown in the last 
column in Table 4, and applied as appropriate. Employing these threshold levels in 
consideration of the estimated counterfactual TR nominal interest rate, Ghana, Guinea 
and Nigeria have the prospects of coming together to form a sustainable currency union 
on the long run. However, with the alternative MR base money growth estimations, The 
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Gambia, Liberia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone would be able to form a sustainable monetary 
integration and operates conveniently within a common monetary policy that would 
adequately ensure the achievement of stability at national levels. Nevertheless, when 
the stability (volatility) of nominal interest rate as policy instruments is considered, The 
Gambia and Nigeria are the best candidates in the TR interest rate estimations while 
The Gambia, Ghana, Liberia and Nigeria are likely candidates of sustainable monetary 
integration as exhibited by the results of the McCallum monetary base growth rate 
estimation. 
Information in Table 5 shows the results of the assessment of the extent to which each 
member country of the WAMZ adopted contractionary/expansionary monetary policies 
in relation to the area-wide counterfactual monetary policy over the period covered by 
this study. The results were determined with the estimation of annual stress levels for 
each country in which information are provided on annual basis of monetary policy 
stance in these countries. The lower these annual values, the more adequate a common 
monetary policy would guarantee the achievement of national stabilisation goals of the 
affected countries.  
Table 5 
Stances of Counterfactual Monetary Policies (in Percentages) (1990-2014) 
Taylor Rule Rate (without interest rate smoothing) 
 Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
Loose (%) 
Tight (%) 
76 
24 
32 
68 
40 
60 
76 
24 
56 
44 
32 
68 
Taylor Rule Rate (with interest rate smoothing) 
Loose (%) 
Tight (%) 
76 
24 
32 
68 
44 
56 
72 
28 
72 
28 
32 
68 
McCallum Rule Monetary Base Growth Rate 
 Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
Loose (%) 
Tight (%) 
56 
44 
100 
0 
54 
46 
83 
17 
64 
36 
76 
24 
 Source: Author's estimations 
The Gambia, Liberia and Nigeria show high degree (over 50%) of expansionary (loose) 
monetary policies over the 25-year period for the TR interest rates. The MR base money 
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growth shows all the WAMZ countries displaying loose monetary policies (over 50%) 
for the years covered by the study. Ghana exhibits the strongest of 100% in this regard.  
The correlation analyses in Table 6 shows that the counterfactual TR nominal interest 
rates for Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone are positively associated with the WAMZ's 
area-wide counterfactual nominal rate as Nigeria demonstrate the very positive 
correlation of 99%, followed by Ghana and Sierra Leone respectively. 
Table 6: Correlation of the Counterfactual Interest Rates and Monetary Growth WAMZ's Member 
with the Common Counterfactual Interest Rates and Money Growth Rates  
Taylor Rule Rate (without interest rate smoothing) 
 Gambia Ghana Guinea Liberia Nigeria S/Leone 
TR Rate -0.02 0.54 -0.04 -0.14 0.99 0.20 
Taylor Rule Rate (with interest rate smoothing) 
TR(S) Rate -0.02 0.54 -0.04 -0.19 0.99 0.21 
McCallum Rule Monetary Base Growth Rate 
McCal. 
Rate 
-0.18 0.69 -0.13 0.21 0.99 0.17 
 Source: Author's estimations and Eviews 
For the MR counterfactual base money growth, The Gambia and Guinea maintain their 
negative association with the counterfactual area-wide base money growth while other 
WAMZ countries exhibit positive relationship as Nigeria again, shows the highest of 
99%. What these suggest is that it is strongly likely that the single monetary policy for 
the WAMZ as a monetary union would be greatly influenced by Nigeria.10 Figures 2-4 (in 
the Appendix) display annual stress levels in the WAMZ countries under the three 
counterfactual monetary policy instruments applied in this study.  
Monetary Stress among the WAMZ countries assessed are better revealed by the results 
of the stress indicators computed by applying Equations 23 and 24 respectively for the 
TR rates and the MR base money growth rate as exhibited in Table 7: 
                                                          
10 As at 2014, Nigeria has over 91% of the total GDP of the entire WAMZ as a monetary zone. 
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Table 7: Results of Estimated Monetary Policy Stress Indicators 
1. Stress Indicators (Lowest to Highest): Taylor 
Nominal Interest Rate Rule  
WAMZ Country Stress Indicator 
Nigeria 2.11 
Ghana 22.23 
Guinea 29.98 
Liberia 32.29 
The Gambia 38.71 
Sierra Leone 46.78 
2. Stress Indicators (Lowest to Highest): Taylor 
Nominal Interest Rate Rule with Interest 
Smoothing  
Nigeria 1.94 
Ghana 20.69 
Guinea 23.98 
Liberia 30.03 
The Gambia 36.69 
Sierra Leone 43.16 
3. Stress Indicators (Lowest to Highest): 
McCallum Base Money Rule  
Nigeria 1.31 
Liberia 6.11 
Sierra Leone 6.75 
The Gambia 8.54 
Ghana 18.32 
Guinea 18.82 
   Source: Author's estimations 
The lower the stress indicator, the easier is the integration into the monetary union as a 
well the adequacy of the common monetary policy for national stability. In Table 7, 
Nigeria is on top of the ladder as the country that would find it most convenient to be 
part of the monetary integration of the WAMZ as well as finding the common currency 
more adequate in meeting her monetary policy objectives of stability. Nigeria is 
followed by Ghana and Guinea respectively in the results yielded by the TR nominal 
interest rate assessment, while Sierra Leone is at the base of the ranking. The evaluation 
of the McCallum (which also exhibits Nigeria at the top) reveals The Gambia, Ghana and 
Guinea as countries that may not find the single monetary policy adequate for the 
achievement of their respective national monetary policy goals. Graphical 
representations of the country-by-country stress indicators are presented in Figures 5-
7 in the appendix. 
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5.1 Summary and Conclusions 
This paper assesses an aspect of the feasibility of the second monetary union within the 
West African sub region, the West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) by examining the 
perspective of the ease of monetary integration of the proposed currency zone as well 
as the adequacy of single monetary policy for national stability of the six member 
countries that would lose their respective monetary independence on the 
commencement of the monetary union and the institution of a common central bank 
which would make single monetary policy for the proposed monetary union. Two 
monetary policy rules (the McCallum monetary base growth rule and the Taylor 
nominal interest rate rule) are employed in this assessment towards estimating the 
levels and indicators of monetary policy stress tests of the WAMZ member countries. 
The research question answered by this paper centers around the extent to which 
future common interest rate and common monetary growth within the WAMZ as a 
monetary union would meet the desires of the member nations and achieve national 
stabilisation purposes in these countries.The study covers a period of 25 years between 
1990 and 2014 and relevant annual secondary data necessary for the analysis were 
collected from various reliable sources and analysed in line with the requirements and 
dictates of the models and equations employed. For my results to reflect some elements 
of the actual behaviour of the related macroeconomics of the member countries 
assessed, weights and coefficients necesary for estimations of these equations were 
generated through the model-dictated OLS econometric regressions.  
From the analyses, there are evidence to suggest that Nigeria has an enormous influence 
over the other five members of the proposed currency union, given the size of her 
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economy, and given this the country is strongly likely to be the crucial major 
determinant of the single monetray policy stance within the future currency union. 
National counterfactual TR nominal interest rates (with and without interest 
smoothing) and McCallum Rule base money growth as  well as the area-wide rate for 
the WAMZ were estimated. Member countries deviations from these rate were also 
calculated and the determining thresholds estimate. The results generated from the two 
Taylor rates are close related.  
However, these two monetary policy rules principally generated varied results. The 
estimated counterfactual TR nominal interest rates suggests that Ghana, Guinea and 
Nigeria have the prospects of coming together to form a sustainable currency union on 
the long run. While the inferences from the alternative MR base money growth 
estimations, is that The Gambia, Liberia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone would be able to form 
a sustainable monetary integration and operates conveniently within a common 
monetary policy that would adequately ensure the achievement of national stability. 
The evaluation of the stability of the counterfactual nominal interest rate as policy 
instruments reveals The Gambia and Nigeria as the best candidates while The Gambia, 
Ghana, Liberia and Nigeria are likely candidates of sustainable monetary integration as 
exhibited by the results of the monetary base growth rate estimation. The most crucial 
evidences given by the two monetary policy rule stress test results are about the 
suggestions of the order in which the six WAMZ countries would be at ease in joining 
the proposed monetary union. For the Taylor rule counterfactual nominal interest rate, 
Nigeria is at the fore front, followed (in the order) by Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, The 
Gambia and Sierra Leone. The evidences from McCallum rule counterfactual base 
money growth monetary stress estimations also shows Nigeria at top of the ladder, 
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followed (in the order) by Liberia, Sierra Leone, The Gambia, Ghana and Guinea. One 
common finding from this monetary policy rules stress tests suggests that Nigeria is 
solely guarenteed to find the monetary integration easy as well the single monetary 
policy adequate for her national stability. 
Some schools of thought opine the Taylor nominal interest rate rule is superior to the 
McCallum base money growth rule (which they believe is an alternative to the Taylor 
rule).  From the point at which this research ends, the decisive question to answer by 
future research should pertain to the more superior and all embracing of the two 
monetary policy models employed by this study. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Figure1: Weight (2014 Nominal GDP-estimated) 
 
Source: EIU database, author's estimations and Excel Output 
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Figure 2: Annual Stress Levels of the WAMZ Countries (Taylor Rule without interest rate 
smoothing) 
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Figure 3: Annual Stress Levels of the WAMZ Countries (Taylor Rule with interest rate smoothing) 
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Figure 4: Annual Stress Levels of the WAMZ Countries (McCallum Rule) 
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Figure 5: Taylor Rule Based Monetary Policy Stress Indicators  
 
 
 
Figure 6: Taylor Rule Based (without interest rate smoothing) Monetary Policy Stress Indicators  
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Figure 7: McCallum Rule Based Monetary Policy Stress Indicators  
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